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Corn is the largest and most widely produced agricultural 
commodity in the United States. What many people do not 
realize, though, is that there is an entrenched connection 
between the everyday practice of filling up one's automobile 
with gasoline and the price trend of this economic giant. That 
connection is through ethanol. This study is observing several 
policy changes on ethanol production incentives instituted by 
the United States between 1978 and 2011. These observations 
are then applied to economic and econometric models in 
which the projected changes deduced per economic theory 
are tested against the statistical changes that occurred in the 
market for corn between 1970 and 2018. The two forms of 
policy of special focus are an ethanol tax credit, effectuated 
between 1978 and 2011, and an ethanol proportion mandate, 
enacted in 2005 and still in effect. Economic theory suggests 
that the tax credit will create multiple effects through an 
inward consumer demand shock in the retail fuel market and 
an outward producer derived demand shock, while a mandate 
will prompt a uniform corn price increase. A regression model 
was employed to explain the time series data, and the results 
validated the economic theory: the tax credit was correlated 
with opposing price-moving forces between supply and 
demand, and the mandate was correlated an overall price 





Over the course of the last five decades, a plethora of United 
States industries from numerous economic sectors have 
become increasingly dependent on corn-based products. The 
economic stimuli could be postulated as reducible to increased 
technical efficiency in corn production coupled with 
protectionist political measures directed to corn producers, 
but this is not the phenomenon in question in this study. What 
is considered here, however, is that the market for consumer-
grade vehicle fuel is a good that has not been excluded from 
the permeation of corn-based products into its market 
constitution. In fact, the contemporary consumer would he 
hard pressed to find fuel at their local gasoline pump that did 
not contain at least some level of corn-base ethanol in it, 
whether it be 10%, 15%, 85%, or some other percentage. 
 The market for consumer-grade fuel, however, was not 
always inclusive of corn-based ethanol. The United States’ 
public policy on the incorporation of ethanol in fuel has 
changed many times over the past fifty years. As a quick 
enumeration of the policy adjustments that the market has 
experienced, here is a list of selected events: 
 
 1978: First ethanol tax credit to blenders ($0.40/gal) 
 1983: Tax credit raised to $0.50/gal 
 1984: Tax credit raised to $0.60/gal 
 1990: Tax credit lowered to $0.54/gal 
 2001: Tax credit lowered to $0.53/gal 
 2003: Tax credit lowered to $0.52/gal 
 2005: Renewable Fuel Standard established, requiring an 
   average ethanol content of 10% in gasoline 
 2011: Tax credit repealed 
 
Each ethanol tax credit is an award given to ethanol blenders 
–wholesalers to fuel retailers— from the federal government. 
Prior to the institution of the first ethanol tax credit in 1978, 
ethanol was seldom, if ever, included in consumer-grade 
vehicle fuel blends. In fact, prior to 1981, data on corn ethanol 
production is so scant in comparison to the production of other 
fuels and fuel substitutes that it is reasonable to suggest that 
ethanol’s production was limited to small consumer items and 
laboratory chemicals. The growth pattern of ethanol 
production following the initial tax credit and its effect on corn 
markets is the economic antecedent upon which this study is 
predicated. 
 
Research Expectations and Theoretical Models 
 
Suppose in a suggested economy, where the behavior of the 
market is assumed to be the aggregation of individual market 
behavior from producers and consumers, the individual 
consumer requires to travel a fixed number of miles. No matter 
what, the consumer must purchase enough fuel required to 
travel the fixed number of miles. For the sake of argument, 
suppose that the consumer must travel 10,000 miles in one 
marketing year. In order to travel those 10,000 miles, the 
consumer must purchase a certain amount of fuel. The 
number of miles that a single unit of fuel will allow the 
consumer to travel is dependent on the efficiency of the fuel. 
Suppose, for example, that one gallon of fuel that is comprised 
of 100% gasoline allows the consumer to travel 25 miles. In this 
case, for the consumer to travel the 10,000 requisite miles in 
the marketing year, they would need to purchase 400 gallons 
of fuel.  
 Similarly, suppose that one gallon of fuel that is comprised 
of 90% gasoline and 10% ethanol allows the consumer to travel 
20 miles. The consumer then would need to purchase 500 
gallons of this fuel in order to travel 10,000 miles. Let us call 
the 100% gasoline fuel “E0” and the 90% gasoline, 10% ethanol 
fuel “E10”. In a graphical supply-demand representation, the 
equilibrium price and quantity of E0 would be at some price 
P*1 and quantity Q*1 = 400. (The graphical model below 
illustrates the general principles of this postulation, from 
which the tenets of this study’s theory and research 
expectations will unfold. Subsequent graphical models will be 
employed throughout this section to support the general 
theory and inform the statistical model that this study will use 
to evaluate the research question.) 
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If all fuel in the economy were to instantly change from E0 to 
E10, then in order to meet the 10,000 mile requirement, the 
demand curve would have to shift outwards until the new 
equilibrium quantity, call it Q*2, is equal to 500. Since supply 
is held constant and the supply curve is upward-sloping, this 
shift of the demand curve outward would create a new 
intersection of supply and demand at a higher point on the 
price axis, call it P*2, so that P*2 > P*1. In addition to this, since 
500 > 400, Q*2 > Q*1. Therefore, (P*2 x Q*2 > P*1 x P*1), 
meaning that the cost of using E10 is always higher to the 
consumer than the cost of using E0. If we assume that in 
reaching the 10,000-mile requirement the consumer would 
prefer to minimize costs, then it is preferable that the 
consumer purchase E0 as opposed to E10. 
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If the consumer abides by their preferences, they will purchase 
more gallons of E0 and fewer gallons of E10. In the factor 
market for gasoline, the equilibrium price and quantity can be 
called Pg*1 and Qg*1, respectively. Likewise, in the factor 
market for ethanol, the equilibrium price and quantity can be 
called Pe*1 and Qe*1. In a doubly derived market for corn, 
equilibrium price and quantity can be called Pc*1 and Qc*1. It 
is important to note that it is note that it is not the consumers 
who are demanding either gasoline or ethanol, only fuel. It is 
fuel blenders who demand gasoline and ethanol and who then 
sell the fuel to fuel retailers who in turn sell to customers 
(barring vertically integrated producers). 
 Since consumers of fuel would prefer E0 to E10 because it 
minimizes costs, the quantity supplied of E10 is very low and 
the quantity supplied of E0 is very high. This is assuming that 
the cost of blending E0 is the same as the cost of blending E10. 
This would manifest itself in identical supply curves of 
consumer fuel, and since the demand curve for E0 is shifted 
outward as compared to E10 (since the consumer prefers E0), 
it is therefore advantageous to supply E0 than E10. This would 
create an inward shift in the supply curve of E10, further 
raising the equilibrium price of E10 and further encouraging 
consumer substitution to E0. This encourages a high demand 
for gasoline and a low demand for ethanol. The equilibrium 
price of gasoline is therefore high, and the equilibrium price of 
ethanol is low at their respective starting values. Since ethanol 
is produced primarily from corn, the low demand for ethanol 
creates a low demand for corn (all else held constant) and a 
low price for corn at its starting values. 
 The problem is perpetuated by the fact that the 
assumption of equal production costs is invalid. The relative 
inefficiency of ethanol with respect to gasoline is realized in 
production costs, making it, in terms of purchasing power, 
more costly for blenders to produce E10 than E0. Assuming 
perfect competition, the supply curves of E10 and E0 are 
assumed to be identical to the respective supply curves of fuel 
blenders, and these would be the supply curves faced by 
consumers. Therefore, the slope of the supply curve for E10 is 
noticeably steeper than the slope of the supply curve for E0, 
so that for every point of intersection of the fuel demand curve 
with each supply curve, E10 will always be costlier to the 
consumer than E0. 
 Insert a tax credit for blenders that reimburses them a flat 
rate for every gallon of ethanol they incorporate into a retail 
fuel blend. While the supply curve for ethanol producers does 
not change, this creates an outward shift in demand by fuel 
blenders for ethanol. While this drives up the equilibrium price 
for ethanol, it does not drive up the price realized by blenders 
because a flat value of each gallon of ethanol is essentially paid 
for by the government in the form of a tax credit. The result is 
that fuel blenders will supply more E10 to fuel retailers and less 
E0 despite consumer preference for E0. This phenomenon 
takes place at the marginal level, however, by making it less 
costly to fuel blenders to supply E10 on a per unit basis since 
the tax credit is also on a per unit basis. Therefore, the slope 
of E10, though it was previously steeper than the slope of E0, 
will become more and more shallow as the tax credit increases 
until it has an identical slope to the supply curve of E0, making 
fuel blenders indifferent to whether they supply E0 or E10. 
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Fuel blenders will inevitably diversify supply from purely E0 
under these conditions because total revenue is bound to 
increase by moving the quantity demanded for fuel towards a 
point at a higher price level for each fuel so that revenues are 
maximized with respect to marginal costs. If fuel economy 
were identical between E0 and E10, this would be a point 
where proportionately adjusted quantity demanded and price 
created a perfect square. Since this is not the case, and it is 
equally preferable for fuel blenders to supply E10 as E0, they 
can take advantage of the 10,000-mile consumer requirement 
in making their supply decisions. 
 Although E10 may have an identical supply curve to E0, 
because of the lower fuel economy of E10 compared to E0, 
consumers will have to purchase a higher quantity of E10 than 
they did E0 in order to meet the requirement of 10,000 
travelled miles. This creates an outward shift in the consumer 
demand curve for fuel so that consumers purchase a higher 
quantity of E10 than they would have of E0 to travel 10,000 
miles. The magnitude of the shift must be such that the 
intersection of the new demand curve with the E10 supply 
curve without the tax credit is at a quantity Q greater than the 
quantity Q*1 created by the intersection of the E0 supply curve 
and the original demand curve in order to emphasize the 
consumer mile requirement. The new equilibrium price and 
quantity is at the intersection of the E10 supply curve with the 
tax credit (equal to the E0 supply curve) and the new, 
outwardly shifted demand curve. At this point, the consumer 
is purchasing at both a higher price and quantity of fuel than 
they would have if all marketed fuel were of the E0 blend. To 
employ the idiom, the tax credit would be “forcing the hand” 
of consumers so that they would have to expend a larger 
proportion of their disposable income on fuel in order to travel 
10,000 miles in a marketing year. 
 The increased demand for ethanol is also realized as an 
outward shift in the demand curve for corn, causing corn prices 
to increase. If the equilibrium price for corn in a market 
without a tax credit for ethanol was below marginal cost, 
supply would have decreased in order to raise the price of 
corn. Because of the tax credit, a supply decrease of the same 
magnitude (if any) is not required for the equilibrium price of 
corn to be reached. The increase of the consumption of E10 
ultimately increases the gross revenues generated from corn 
production, but the costs are deferred to the government 
(taxpayer) and to fuel consumers. 
 Now that the basic premise of corn price behavior in 
response to ethanol incentivization is understood, the 
responsiveness of corn prices can be further deduced through 
the relaxation of the assumption of fixed miles travelled. The 
demand for consumer-grade vehicle fuel under the relaxed 
assumption becomes dependent not on the exogenous 
constraint, but on the equilibration of fuel supply and demand. 
Relaxing the mileage constraint suggests that demand will 
react to the changes in supplier behavior. With respect to the 
two demand curves under the constraint, the notion that the 
consumer will prefer E0 to E10 on account of its greater fuel 
efficiency remains. In this case, it can be estimated that 
consumption behavior for E0 will move in a direction opposite 
to that of E10. Essentially, two separate markets for fuel are 
created after the enactment of the 1978 ethanol tax credit, 
one in which consumer demand shifts outward to raise prices 
(E0) and one in which demand shifts inward to lower prices 
(E10). 
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Whereas correlation between the prices of ethanol, corn, and 
gasoline may have incidentally correlated prior to the 
enactment of the tax credit, the model suggests that this 
correlation decreases after the tax credit. While the magnitude 
of the tax credit fluctuates over time between 1978 and 2011, 
it is the effect of the tax credit’s existence that is of primary 
import to this study. 
 The enactment of the Renewable Fuel Standard in 2005, 
however, suggests a different effect in the behavior of fuel 
supply and demand than that of the tax credit, and thus a 
different effect on the price of corn. With the advent of the 
ethanol mandate per the RFS, the new legal requirement was 
that retail fuel generally have a minimum proportion of fuel be 
comprised of ethanol. This requirement precludes any 
widespread development of alternative fuel markets to those 
markets which have an ethanol blend. Since the mandate’s 
indiscriminate applicability is with respect to suppliers of fuel 
and not consumers, the costs associated with the transfer of 
moderate fuel volumes containing ethanol to nearly all fuel 
volumes containing ethanol are incurred by suppliers. This 
shifts upward the supply curve for E10 while all but abolishing 
the supply curve for E0. Without E0, demand for E10 restores 
to a level proportional to its relative fuel economy to E0. 
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The increase in the price of fuel as a result of the RFS is met 
with a proportional increase in the demand for ethanol, which 
in turn proportionally increases demand for corn. Therefore, 
under the RFS, the price of corn can be interpreted as being 
codependent with the price of gasoline, experiencing a general 
increase after 2005, assuming that the RFS effect dominates 
the tax credit effect. With the repealing of the tax credit in 
2011, the supplier price support is taken away, so a reverse 
effect of what happened to the supply curve for fuel after the 
tax credit is expectable. 
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This change strengthens the correlation between the price of 
corn and the price of gasoline after 2011 because the 




To describe the counteracting phenomena from the tax credit 
and the Renewable Fuel Standard postulated by the 
theoretical model, a simple linear regression model approach 
was employed. While it may be altered in future study to 
capture the exact effects of each of the different forms of 
ethanol policy, functional form was left relatively unchanged 
from its default arrangement of level variables and 
corresponding parameters. The sign, comparative magnitude, 
and statistical significance of each of the variables of special 
interest was of the immediate essence here rather than the 
values of the estimators themselves in succinctly describing 
the precise effect of ethanol policy decisions on corn prices. 
 To inform the statistical model as to what specific variables 
of interest would best aid the definition of explanatory factors, 
the changes in both corn and gasoline prices were compared 
throughout several time intervals, specifically those intervals 
where the arrangement of public policy on ethanol production 
was altered. Their correlations are enumerated in the table 
below: 
 
Year Range Level Log 
1970-1978 0.905621 0.870111 
1979-2005 0.171992 0.204697 
2006-2011 0.829768 0.755167 
2012-2017 0.857493 0.863973 
 
 In addition to the several variables of special interest 
intended to represent changes in ethanol policy, several 
controlling variables were included to accommodate for other 
major factors predicted to be instrumental in the 
determination of the price of corn. These variables are not 
exhaustive and were included specifically to help shed light on 
the potential effects of the variables concerning ethanol 
policy. These variables account for average national gasoline 
prices, real gross domestic product, an agricultural 
productivity index, and public and private research and 
development investments into the agricultural sector across 
the time period from 1970 to 2014. 
 The variables intended to account for the effect of ethanol 
policies on corn prices are multifold. The two different forms 
of ethanol policy, namely the tax credit and the mandate, are 
independent from one another and create their own separate 
effects, yet these effects take hold in the market for corn 
specifically when they interact with the price of gasoline, as 
suggested by the theoretical models. Therefore, two of the 
variables of special interest are an interaction term between a 
time dummy for the ethanol tax credit and the price of gasoline 
and an interaction term between a time dummy for the 
Renewable Fuel Standard and the price of gasoline. The inward 
shift in consumer demand for E10 per the theoretical model 
also is an effect that takes hold because of the existence of the 
tax credit itself, so in addition to the interaction term, a time 
dummy accounting for the time during which the ethanol tax 
credit was in effect was also included. Finally, the high 
correlation between gasoline prices and corn prices in the year 
range of 1970 to 1978 in the immediately preceding table 
suggested that a placeholder time dummy interacted with the 
price of gasoline also be included to account for a time period 
of economic tumult and tenuousness that marked the decade 
of the 1970’s, where because of periodic oil shocks, the prices 
of commodities not inherently correlated like corn and 
gasoline may have been each correlated with the price of oil. 
 With the obvious inclusion of a variable for the price of corn 
itself, the variables were organized into a simple linear 
regression format: 
 




 𝑃𝑐 = corn price 
 𝛼 = constant 
 𝑃 = gasoline price (parameter 𝛽) 
 𝑌 = real GDP (parameter 𝛾) 
 𝐸 = agricultural productivity index (parameter 𝛿) 
 𝐼 = R&D investments (parameter 𝜃) 
 𝑇 = tax credit dummy (parameter ) 
 𝐷 ∗ 𝑃 = oil shock dummy & gas price (parameter 𝜇) 
 𝑇 ∗ 𝑃 = tax credit dummy & gas price (parameter 𝜋) 
 𝑀 ∗ 𝑃 = RFS dummy & gas price (parameter 𝜌) 
 
Where the sample regression model is concerned, an error 





The tabular results of this study have been parceled out into two illustrations— one with all of the data from the regression and one 
with selected data considered most relevant to the question. 
 
 
Complete Regression Results 
 
Regression Statistics 
       
Multiple R 0.957045291 
       
R Square 0.915935689 




       
Standard Error 0.446790216 
       
Observations 45 
       
         
ANOVA 
        
  df SS MS F Significance 
F 
   
Regression 8 78.30024684 9.787530855 49.0304452 4.55787E-17 
   
Residual 36 7.186373883 0.199621497 
     
Total 44 85.48662072       
   
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept -1.894106199 0.761353645 -2.487813923 0.01762011 -3.43820296 -0.3500094 -3.43820296 -0.350009438 
Gas Price (USD) 1.305594245 0.309955456 4.212199595 0.00016156 0.676975445 1.93421305 0.676975445 1.934213045 




-0.905882846 1.024734909 -0.884016772 0.38255316 -2.98414157 1.17237588 -2.98414157 1.172375876 
R&D Investment 
($bil) 
0.01401323 0.117337691 0.1194265 0.90560145 -0.22395864 0.2519851 -0.22395864 0.251985096 
Oil*P -0.136648778 0.118406788 -1.154062028 0.25607884 -0.37678888 0.10349132 -0.37678888 0.103491319 
Tax credit 
dummy 
2.247916856 0.984486483 2.283339481 0.02841643 0.251285725 4.24454799 0.251285725 4.244547986 
Tax Credit 
interaction 
-0.980908544 0.320201622 -3.063409043 0.00412793 -1.63030753 -0.3315096 -1.63030753 -0.331509556 
RFS*Pg 0.251057056 0.140461997 1.78736642 0.08230013 -0.03381308 0.53592719 -0.03381308 0.535927189 
Selected Regression Results 
 
Adjusted R Squared 0.897254731 
 
   
  Coefficients P-value 
Intercept -1.894106199 0.01762 
Gas Price (USD) 1.305594245 0.000162 
rGDP ($bil) 9.46748E-05 0.066764 
Agr Productivity Index -0.905882846 0.382553 
R&D Investment ($bil) 0.01401323 0.905601 
Oil*P -0.136648778 0.256079 
Tax credit dummy 2.247916856 0.028416 
Tax Credit interaction -0.980908544 0.004128 
RFS*Pg 0.251057056 0.0823 
 As for the controlling variables, there was statistically 
significant, positive explanatory power shown in gas prices and 
real GDP as expected. The agricultural productivity index, 
reflecting increasing productive efficiency over time, was 
unsurprisingly negative. Its statistical significance was tenuous 
and was not reflective of a satisfactory degree of confidence in 
the variable’s explanatory power. The R&D investment control 
variable, however, was not statistically significant, suggesting 
that, at least during the observed time period, the study did 
not detect a conclusive effect of agricultural research and 
development investment efforts on corn prices.  
 As for the variables of specific interest, a counteracting 
effect was found between the tax credit binary variable and 
the tax credit interaction term, just as was suspected from the 
theoretical model. Each of those variables was overwhelmingly 
statistically significant, up through a 95% level of confidence. 
The RFS interaction term was significant for 90% confidence 
and showed a positive relationship between the instatement 
of the Renewable Fuel Standard and corn prices. The adjusted 
R-squared further suggests that the estimators are highly 
explanatory of the data. .  
 Overall, the coefficients were reasonable in their 
magnitude with respect to the general expectations of the 
regression as compared to the theoretical model, and each 
showed its expected sign, and the regression’s estimators 
were generally significant. The oil shock interaction term was 
not significant with a satisfactory confidence level, but this fact 
does not come a surprise that alters the interpretation of the 
data. The oil shocks that marked the 1970’s —which served as 
a placeholder phenomenon through a dummy variable 
interaction term— though correlating gas price with corn price 
through common price connections in the market for crude oil, 
were not systematic in the market for corn. In this case, a 
longer time series would likely be needed to retest their 
significance. The three terms that were of especial note in this 
study were the tax credit dummy variable, the tax credit and 
gasoline price interaction term, and the Renewable Fuel 
Standard and gasoline price interaction term. Not only were 
each of these terms statistically significant, but their signs and 
magnitudes reflected what the hypothesis anticipated and 
what the theoretical economic model explicated. Two 
counteracting corn price effects resulted from the tax credit 





There are two key conclusions to be drawn from this study. The 
first is that an ethanol tax credit has a two-sided effect on corn 
prices. While by way of fuel suppliers an ethanol tax credit 
raises derived demand for corn and therefore its price, by way 
of fuel final fuel consumers the demand for fuel shifts, and a  
cap manifests on the degree to which ethanol’s inclusion in 
consumer-grade fuel blends impacts the corn market. This cap 
is contingent on trends in fuel consumption, such that ethanol 
demand increases as fuel consumption increases. As a 
conclusory byproduct, the economic deduction from these 
counteracting effects is that instantaneous equilibrium 
quantities of E0 and E10 likely exist in the market for 
consumer-grade fuel under an ethanol tax credit, suggesting 
the same may be true in the derived market for corn holding 
all else constant.  
 The overall result of the tax credit only creates modest 
growth in the real price of corn in the long run. The ethanol 
mandate via the Renewable Fuel Standard, however, 
consistently raises corn price over time in a way that 
supersedes the floundering effect of the tax credit. Perhaps 
the most certain and insightful extrapolation from this study, 
though, is that different economic approaches to ethanol 
policy, even if they have the same economic goals, can 
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